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Abstract
In this article we explore the idea of public accountability in the contemporary entrepreneurial
governance of cities, which are influenced by market dependency and private sector involvement.
We specifically focus on the fragmentation of public accountability through hybrid contractual
landscapes of governance, in which the public and private sector actors interactively produce a
diversity of instruments to ensure performance in service. This is in sharp contrast to the tra-
ditional vague norms and values appealed to by urban planning institutions, to safeguard the public
interest. We argue that within these complex contractual governance environments public
accountability is produced by public and private sector actors, through highly diverse sets of
contractual relations and diverse control instruments that define responsibilities of diverse actors
who are involved in a project within a market-dependent planning and policy making environ-
ment, which contains context-specific characteristics set by the specific rules of public-private
collaboration. These complexities mean public accountability has become fragmented and largely
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reduced to performance control. Moreover, our understanding of contractual urban governance
remains vague and unclear due to very limited empirical studies focusing on the actual technol-
ogies of contractual urban development. By deciphering the complex hybrid landscapes of con-
tractual governance, with comparative empirical evidence from The Netherlands, UK and Brazil,
we demonstrate how public accountability is assuming a more ‘contractual’ and unpredictable
meaning in policy and plan implementation process.
Keywords
Hybrid regulatory landscapes, institutional complexity, accountability regimes, public accountabil-
ity, control instruments, contracts
Introduction
In recent years complex individualized ‘governmentalities’ have emerged that characterise
the current phase of late capitalism through their assemblage of technologies, routines and
modes of conduct (Peck, 2013). This is particularly the case with property-led urban regen-
eration, which is increasingly dependent on contractual arrangements between public and
private sector actors. In this context planning has increasingly assumed the form of a com-
plex collection of contracts seeking to regulate urban development dominated by public-
private partnerships, outsourcing of government functions, or privatization (Forrer et al.,
2010). This form of planning characterises a specific type of urban development, and creates
contractual landscapes, which contain complex regimes of accountability (Tas¸an-Kok et al.,
2019a; Dubnick, 2010) in which public and private stakeholders are connected through
contractual rules (clauses, statutory regulations, penalties, sanctions or incentives, etc).
With these in mind, and as a response to growing literature on decreasing perceived respon-
sibility and accountability of the public sector in this form of urban planning, this article
develops a new conceptual framework to understand the public accountability mechanisms
accommodated in dynamic, hybrid contractual landscapes of governance by asking how the
meaning of public accountability changes in this complex regulatory environment; and whether,
and to what extent public accountability ‘disappears’ in such planning processes?While seeking
answers to these questions we also illustrate the contemporary forms of public accountability
in property-led urban regeneration projects on the basis of our research findings.
One cannot simply ‘read off’ the specific forms public accountability takes due to the enor-
mous diversity of associated regulatory arrangements. These changes are redefining the nature
of accountability, which takes on a more contractual, complex, and fragmented form.
Fragmentation here refers to the institutional complexity caused by the increasingly diverse
types of actors (organisations) involved in contemporary urban development, or as Pattberg
et al. (2014: 5) put it, the ‘proliferation, specialization and diversification of institutions, actor-
constellations, norms and discourses active in an issue-area’. These regulatory activities accom-
modate equally complex regimes of accountability, which are difficult to follow, analyse, con-
ceptualise and evaluate. Aiming to fill this gap, wemeticulously studied the complex contractual
forms of accountability regimes in diverse governance systems, which not only enabled us to
establish the theoretical foundations of ‘hybrid contractual landscapes of governance’ but also to
decipher the nature of the transformation of public accountability in urban planning.
The existing literature recognises that these contractual forms of urban development,
created by private sector involvement, diminishes the public sector’s accountability to
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urban residents (Healey, 2006; Raco, 2014). However, understanding of this process remains
vague and unclear. Our study untangles the dynamics of contractual governance in urban
regeneration across a range of different contexts. The complex web of relations accommo-
dated in these projects are produced by a diversity of relations, actors and funds, and
controlled through a variety of legal instruments. Each urban regeneration project contains
complex networks of relations, which the planning system seeks to accommodate through
different zoning and planning mechanisms. In this complex governance environment, public
responsibilities are unclear as they are delegated to diverse parties at diverse scales, and
standardized bureaucratic routines no longer function.
We conceptualize the phenomenon of complex hybrid contractual landscapes formed by
these fragmented regimes of accountability. An accountability regime refers to the collection
of rules and regulations, which we call ‘pockets of micro-regulation’, that constitute respon-
sibilities and liabilities for each involved actor (public or private organisations, NGOs,
individuals, etc) in an urban project. We argue that fragmented accountability regimes
are produced by bundles of contractual relations which define the responsibilities of diverse
actors within a market-dependent planning environment. In simple terms, each accountabil-
ity regime creates and uses specific control instruments to bind parties together, which
cannot be standardised. We draw on several sources of information including interviews,
contracts and desk-research that resulted in institutional mapping, discourse and contract
analysis conducted for a larger research project that aimed to investigate contractual gov-
ernance in Brazil, the Netherlands and the UK. Studying three different institutional frame-
works, we show how these hybrid contractual landscapes create new institutional
complexities in the governance and planning of contemporary cities. Although the conse-
quences of these accountability regimes vary in different governance contexts, we show in
this article that creating regulatory instruments that attempt to hold those involved account-
able at multiple scales of governance makes overall public accountability difficult to enforce.
Thus, as argued by Poulsen (2009), while public accountability does not entirely ‘disappear’,
it creates the co-existence of competing, and arguably irreconcilable, modes of governance
and contradictory interpretations of administrative accountability. As we demonstrate,
there is not a lack of legal mechanisms to hold (somebody) accountable in this form of
planning. On the contrary, as demonstrated elsewhere (Tas¸an-Kok et al., 2019a) there is an
increasing amount and diversity of accountability mechanisms codified in the contracts,
increasing the complexity of the regulatory environment, making it ‘difficult to see the
forest for the trees’. Thus these fragmented accountability regimes are not only formed by
the complex bundles of institutional relations, along with a diversity of regulatory control
instruments, but they are also dependent on market conditions, which prevents production
and reproduction of predictable and standardized accountability mechanisms.
Ironically, even though the public sector attempts to create concrete measures to ‘control’
private sector actions and remain accountable to citizens through concrete and operational
forms of regulation, the overall meaning of public accountability becomes more opaque.
This approach of ensuring public accountability through control instruments for private
sector involvement appears to be indicative of what Verhaeghe (2012) refers to as the ‘loss of
norms and values in a wider society’, generating different types of ethics based on codes and
regulations including ‘contract ethics’. In this regulatory environment it is difficult to have
an overall view on responsibilities as each public-private collaboration seems to be obscured
by a ‘contractual wall of silence’ and ‘commercial confidentiality’ on top of the complex web
of relations and responsibilities defined by regimes of accountability. Accountability to the
public, which traditionally is assumed to be based on transparency, has mutated into
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mechanisms seeking to ‘balance’ commercial interests, privacy regulations and rules of con-
trol, rather than to guarantee and protect a wider public in this environment (Raco, 2013).
In the following section we first explore the idea of hybrid landscapes of governance
before providing an analysis on the implications of the involvement of a diversity of actors
and their mutual relations in creating regimes of accountability. We then focus on the actual
forms taken by instruments of accountability developed and deployed to control different
aspects of public and private cooperation through contracts. Finally, we illustrate how
control instruments measure and regulate the performance of private sector involvement
whilst simultaneously becoming accountability tools, albeit of a diverse and project-specific
form, adding to the complexity of urban governance.
Analysing regimes of accountability in Brazil, the Netherlands and UK
Context
We collected and analysed data from nine cases from Amsterdam, Maastricht and
Amersfoort in the Netherlands; Bristol, Gloucester, and Taunton in the UK; and S~ao
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in Brazil.1 In all countries, the regeneration projects had their
own ‘contextual logic’ created by the prevailing political decision-making culture and plan-
ning traditions, leading to diverse approaches to accountability. We selected the cases that
satisfy a set of criteria: Private sector partners play a significant role in the project; contracts
are in place between public, private, and/or other types of actors; the project is significant
for those involved but also for the wider area/city; the project is either well underway or
completed; the project aims to achieve a mix of objectives – economic, social and environ-
mental – that can be related to sustainable urban development; the area has existing or
adjacent residents who have ‘claims on the area’ or are even part of the partnership, for
instance by being represented on the governing board; and the project includes the use of a
series of planning instruments that help achieve certain project outcomes.
In Brazil the types of ‘contractual regeneration’ projects we studied are a relatively recent
phenomenon (Martins and Santos Pereira, 2019). The Public Private Partnership (PPP) Law
was introduced in 2004, establishing the security conditions for private investment. Much of
what the contracts establish is laid out in laws. The Consorted Urban Operation, for exam-
ple, is defined by a national law (City Statute); its conditions and requirements are set in a
Master Plan, which is a municipal regulation. The same applies to PPPs. This means that
many of the rules and norms applied are based on Statutory Planning. In the selected cities
S~ao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro there were potentially significant opportunities to improve
infrastructure and encourage various forms of economic development through private
sector involvement in low-density, undervalued areas, close to areas of great real estate
interest. They all proposed to promote social housing in these areas as part of urban regen-
eration. However, in terms of the overall projects the amount of social housing stayed
marginal.
In the Netherlands there has always been – and probably always will be – a dialogue
between public and private sector actors through formal and informal institutional ties, and
urban planning has long been based on a regulated consensus-based model of planning.
Contractual arrangements are part of plan-driven Dutch urban development tradition, but
the nature of these partnerships with increased market dependency and private sector
involvement has been changing. The Dutch private sector has been involved in contractual
agreements through joint ventures, concessions, and private development (van den Hurk
and Tas¸an-Kok, 2020). The selected projects reflected the transformation of Dutch urban
4 EPC: Politics and Space 0(0)
governance through different periods of time and represent different periods in terms of
contractual agreements, processes and accountability instruments. Particular relations
between public and private sector actors were established in these periods in diverse
forms of urban regeneration, regulated through private-law agreements (Tas¸an-Kok et
al., 2019a). The Dutch planning model has been traditionally based on active land devel-
opment, where the public sector provides (sells) private sector land ready for development,
which creates continuous negotiation, dialogue and contractual relations. Diverse account-
ability mechanisms have always been part of urban regeneration contracts since the late-
1980s.
In the UK the partnership approach has been firmly established since the early 1990s,
indeed one might say this approach has become the standard modus operandi, of urban
regeneration. Depending on the public authorities’ intentions and the market conditions, the
decision-making processes in the UK vary in terms of the attitudes of developers and invest-
ors towards the planning system. Planning agreements are set to regulate each project’s
special conditions, and legislation allows local authorities to request financial contributions
by the developer to pay for infrastructure works that enable the development to go ahead
(Tas¸an-Kok et al., 2019b). Private developers often renegotiate these agreements after con-
tracts had been signed (Burgess et al., 2011). All three UK cases had been essentially ‘aban-
doned’ for a number of years and had few, if any residents, living there or adjacent to them.
The Harbourside development is on a site previously used for port related activities in
central Bristol, to the west of the city center. The development is for mixed use – housing,
leisure/recreational and cultural facilities. The Quays site is located in part of the former
docks in Gloucester. The development focused on the provision of retail, accommodation,
and leisure activities. The Firepool project is viewed as a strategic employment site in
Taunton; the development has a ‘business focus’ including creative knowledge-based indus-
tries as well as incorporating retail, leisure and housing. In addition, the creation of a high-
quality public realm is aimed for.
Research methods and data
Following an initial phase of desk research, we used a qualitative form of Social Network
Analysis (SNA) to create institutional maps illustrating how the governance of contractual
urban regeneration was institutionalised. The institutional maps highlighted the specific
configuration of actors involved and resource interdependencies, channels for the exchange
of resources, information, and knowledge in each project. However, the complex institu-
tional maps are only illustrated through abstract figures in this article. In each country they
revealed there were differences in the governance of private sector involvement in urban
regeneration. By selecting case studies with similar backgrounds, location and character-
istics, we aimed to understand the instrumentalisation of accountability measures. We ana-
lysed the details of the contractual documents structuring the involvement of the private
sector in urban regeneration, and investigated the impacts of new meanings, forms and
control instruments related to the public sector in the selected projects.
In total in-depth and semi-structured interviews were conducted (35 in the Netherlands;
30 in the UK; and 31 in Brazil) with public and private parties involved in contractual
agreements. For this article information from 12 respondents has been used for direct ref-
erence, although we have used general knowledge accumulated from the above-mentioned
interview data as well. Secondly, we analysed how public accountability is practiced in the
three countries by using micro level content and discourse analysis. Our comparative meth-
odology was based on observed similarities to explain common characteristics (of
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complexifying governance of urban regeneration in three countries), which is defined by
Pickvance (2001) as ‘universalizing comparative analysis’.
Due to regulatory and planning system differences in three countries some differences
exist in contractual governance of urban regeneration as explained above. There are also
some similarities in the ways public sector authorities dealt with power hierarchies, and
involvement of private sector companies through certain legal, contractual instruments, and
those common trends were our point of departure for the next section.
Hybrid landscapes of contractual governance in urban regeneration
Along with the contemporary neoliberal forms of development of cities, complex new
governmentalities have emerged, which Arts and Lagendijk (2009) characterise as new men-
talities and acts of governing, involving more administrative tiers in policymaking. First,
public administrations have developed increasingly multi-organisational, fragmented, and
multi-scalar regulatory structures by downscaling government responsibilities and cooper-
ating with market actors (Brenner, 2004; Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Secondly, in order to
cope with the multi-scalar and multi-sectoral interconnectivity between increasingly com-
plex arrays of actors and organisations, new technologies of governance are constantly
created and deployed (Harvey, 1989; Moore et al., 2018), albeit often on an ad hoc basis.
Therefore contracts, legal deeds and agreements become increasingly important instruments
to regulate these relations.
The term ‘hybrid contractual landscape’ is used here to address a specific form of urban
governance, which consists of ‘pockets of micro regulation’s (Tas¸an-Kok et al., 2019a), which
define and contain accountability regimes (see Figure 2). What is common in all these
‘pockets’ is an evolving and often complex mix of regulatory landscapes and forms of
privatisation. ‘Hybrid’ refers to the complex articulation of regulatory forms. More specif-
ically, it addresses mixed, evolving and dynamic relations, bundled together through differ-
ent regulatory instruments to address the individualized needs of property development.
These dynamic multi-actor environments, resembling what Peck (2013) defines as ‘hybrid
neoliberal practices’, containing bundles of project-specific, inter-institutional regulations
and rules that aim at diverse scales of governance to control the responsibilities and actions
of participating organisations (see Figure 1). These bundles are not only loaded with dense,
overlapping institutional relationships containing contracting/formal links, funding chan-
nels, and lobbying/informal relationships, but also their density, form and contents change
constantly in each project, creating fragmented and dynamic regimes of accountability.
How then, in these dynamic landscapes of governance, are public accountability mech-
anisms accommodated? Critiques of neoliberal meta-narratives are usually based on the
macro-level economic, social and political drivers of change, and miss what Blanco et al.
(2014, pp. 3130-3131) term the ‘micro-level accounts of the messiness of local urban politics
and practices’. We seek to shed some light on the impact of these ‘messy local urban
practices’ in relation to the accountability of the public sector. Accountability is linked to
a specific set of relationships created through obligations and requirements accepted by both
public sector and private firm(s) in the form of a contract. It is based on ‘technical apparatus
of rules’, focusing on control and consequence (Heidelberg, 2015). In hybrid contractual
landscapes diverse forms of accountability are created through regulatory deals as a result of
a complex and interactive form of negotiation, renegotiation and consensus building pro-
cesses. They are formed by the co-production and interactive transformation of rules and
regulations through contracts. In that sense, it brings to the public sphere a form of market
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Figure 1. Accountability regime in a project.
Figure 2. Hybrid landscape of governance.
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rationality, in which the requirement of profit implicitly sets the fundamental rules of con-
trol during these negotiation processes.
In what follows we aim to show first of all, how, in this complex governance environment,
bundles of contractual relations form accountability regimes, what these regulatory control
instruments contain, and how they are affected by market conditions. We then focus on
these instruments and investigate their nature. As we indicated, the boundaries of public and
private sector roles and responsibilities are blurred due to the complexity and multi-scalar
diversity of these instruments and relations. We then show how this complexity adds to the
messiness of local policymaking practices, resulting in public accountability becoming opa-
quer on the one hand, and simultaneously more concrete and operational on the other, as
the public sector searches for concrete measures to “control” private sector actions so as to
remain accountable to citizens in an increasingly complex governance environment.
Fragmented regimes of public accountability in hybrid
contractual governance
Involvement of the private sector in the development of a project influences the interaction
between public authorities and citizens due to the profit-oriented nature and power dynam-
ics of businesses. These complex networks of relations are defined by a diversity of institu-
tional relations and control mechanisms coordinated through the legal containers of
contracts, funding and lobbying relations. In each relationship, competing and sometimes
conflicting modes of governance not only co-exist through diverse interpretations of admin-
istrative accountability but are also interactively produced through regulations, legal docu-
ments, and contracts set by public and private sector agencies, which aim to control the
different actions of involved parties.
Traditionally accountability refers to the ‘virtuous behaviour’ official authorities ought to
display in order to conform with their public duties. In terms of urban development,
decision-making, and policy implementing bodies need to be accountable for their actions,
decisions and the consequences of their choices, which requires defining the boundaries of
ethical or moral decisions in a normative manner. Thus governments, politicians and public
officials are held responsible by explaining and justifying their actions and decisions to a
wider public, not just in elections but also through specific formal institutional mechanisms
and more ‘informally’ through the media. The respective responsibilities of public and pri-
vate sector actors, their accountability and involvement in these services differ, depending
on the form of collaboration established between public and private sector actors.
In the public administration literature these forms of accountability based on mutual
responsibilisation and control mechanisms is described as co-governance or hybrid forms of
public accountability (Goetz and Jenkins, 2001; Jenkins and Goetz, 1999; Poulsen, 2009).
However, increasingly complex project-driven urban development makes it difficult to
understand the fundamental principles of who is accountable, why and what they are
accountable for. This complexity derives from three intertwined sets of dynamics: one is
defined by a set of complex bundles of institutional relations and the other by a particular
set of instruments to control formal/contractual relations, which for every single project
form a unique, context-dependent regime of public accountability. Neither of these are
practiced in a standardised manner. And finally, market-dependent conditions add to the
fragmentation of public accountability due to the project-specific context in which public-
private collaboration takes place. Each project, shaped by institutional relations, regulatory
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control instruments, and specific market conditions, forms an accountability regime
(Figure 1).
As urban regeneration projects proliferate, pushed and pulled by the market conditions
and regulatory frameworks, the web of rules and accountability mechanisms are formed in
each of them, forming regimes of accountability through contracts, setting responsibilities,
liabilities and sanctions to deal with the involvement of diversity of actors through an ever
expanding web of regulations setting a very complex and hybrid landscape of governance
(Figure 2).
The combination of these tendencies, we believe, is becoming a trend in contemporary
governance contexts across the globe, forming diverse and fragmented regimes of account-
ability as we studied and illustrated in the cases of Dutch, British and Brazilian cities.
Complex bundles of institutional relations
In order to understand the changing perception of public accountability in this context, one
needs to understand the type of relationship(s) contracts seek to control and the mechanisms
through which the subject of contracts are ‘held to account’. The relations between public
and private sector actors are subject to performance measurement through jointly agreed
criteria, controlled through sanctions or penalties, and stimulated through incentives. The
complex web of relations that exist in each project means that for every project local gov-
ernment has to devise tools and develop custom-made contractual agreements as each time
the legal impact of the contracts may be different. In each project accountability regimes are
established based on ever changing and context dependent relations and regulations, form-
ing pockets of micro-regulation practices (see Figure 1).
This is a simplified and illustrative picture of a project, showing how public, private and
non-profit actors are linked through bundles of multi-scalar financial, formal or informal
relationships at a particular point of time, forming a complex accountability regime. This
illustration is abstracted from more complex institutional maps that provide the existing
connections between real actors in the nine case study projects from Brazil, the Netherlands,
and the UK. What is important to note is that each project, even within the same institu-
tional system, has its own unique contractual landscape of hybrid relationships, which can
be mapped at a point in time, though the reality contains a set of dynamic and ever-changing
relations set by regulatory instruments that is difficult to convey in a static institutional map
(Tas¸an-Kok et al., 2019b). Although exhibiting different forms and linkages, three catego-
ries of relationships emerge: funding; lobbying (informal relationships, advisory relation-
ships, oral consensus, etc.); and formal relationships (e.g. planning legislation, contracts,
legal agreements, etc.).
Categorized by public, profit, and non-profit sectors at national, regional, urban, district
and neighbourhood scales, our institutional maps revealed certain patterns of relations.
Both the Dutch and UK cases exhibit ‘centralisation’ tendencies, particularly at the city
scale, albeit more in the former. However, care must be taken to avoid over-generalising
these trends. For instance, in one of the Dutch cases the City of Amsterdam retains a key
role in terms of formal and lobbying relations, while national government plays equally
dominant roles in the other selected cases. Greater fragmentation of responsibilities and
relations are observed in the UK cases where national, city, district and even neighbourhood
scales of public sector organisations are involved. Moreover, various central government
organisations/agencies retain a significant presence in the UK cases in terms of funding,
while in the Brazilian and Dutch cases this is either organised around a single organisation
or provided through a variety of funding relations. Each country displays different relations
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established through control instruments. In the Netherlands, each project has very different
formal relations displaying different densities in each project. Lobbying also varies widely in
the three countries. In Brazil lobbying relations seem to be scattered horizontally in some
projects and more centrally focused in others. In the UK the significance of lobbying varied
between cases and in different phases of the developments (e.g. in the planning stage when it
was most evident).
The accountability regimes in the three cities, reflected in the institutional maps, demon-
strates the presence of a complex web of rules and regulations, leading to a byzantine set of
responsibilities and liabilities in each project. However, the characteristics and nature of the
fragmentation of accountability regimes display different causes in each country. The frag-
mentation of accountability regimes in Brazil is influenced by visible income inequalities
spatialised in cities, more involvement of informal mechanisms in city building, as well as
power hierarchies embedded in urban politics. The projects in the Netherlands and the UK
were much smaller than in Brazil, but were also encouraging the development of new eco-
nomic opportunities, often through the involvement of ‘third sector’ bodies. Accountability
regimes in general both in the Netherlands and the UK, are more focused on legitimising the
developments themselves and new forms of power, rather than addressing basic societal
inequalities related to housing and infrastructure.
Although trust relations and learning practices were established through the interactions
between public and private sector actors, this process of reciprocal relationships did not
directly include citizens, nor was it transparent especially during the initial stage of develop-
ment, a stage that contains complex lobbying activities between public and private sector
agencies. Vancoppenolle and Verschuere (2012) describe the problems caused by this com-
plex set of relations as ‘dysfunctional or non-existent accountability relations’. In this envi-
ronment, these complex patterns of relations created diverse, and at times impenetrable,
forms of accountability. As we are interested in understanding the nature of contractual
(formal) landscapes of governance, in the next section we will zoom in on the formal relation-
ships where public accountability was interactively produced and safeguarded by project
specific regulatory control instruments between the public and private actors involved.
Regulatory control instruments in contractual relations
Dubnick and Frederickson (2011) argue that regulatory tools such as contracts seek to solve
the problems of control, legitimacy and performance, and to frame general public and
private sector responsibilities. While diverse forms of accountability exist within one project
they are primarily concerned to control ‘wrongdoing’, thereby creating fragmented regimes
and forms of accountability. Lindberg (2013) defines several types of accountability
(bureaucratic, patron-client, fiscal, political, audit, societal, representative, peer profession-
al, legal and reputational) based on their vertical and horizontal source, and strength of
controls in public administration. What emerges as significant is the ‘objective of control’
attached to these mechanisms and the dominance of management and performance oriented
instruments. In order to understand these complex accountability regimes in urban regen-
eration it is necessary to zoom in on these formal relationships set by contracts. These tools,
which mainly aim to control and regulate the relationship between the involved parties in
contractual relationships, accumulate forming bundles of diverse sizes as illustrated in
Figure 3.
The contractual relations in each project are interactively produced through an array of
institutional tools to control diverse behavioural, procedural and democratic processes as
can be seen in Table 1. These institutional tools are categorised on the basis of the empirical
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material from the selected case studies, which is summarised in Appendix. As can be seen
from this material there is a great diversity of tools and use of measures even within the same
country or city. Procedural control mechanisms in contracts usually contain quality, time and
tools for project management, responsibilities and ethics. These mechanisms seek to guar-
antee price and transactions through tools like option agreements, measure performance
relative to the arrangements made in the contract, and determine management quality,
liability on obligations and clauses to guarantee exit conditions in case things get out of
control. Democratic control and transparency mechanisms contain communication and con-
fidential agreements on the one hand, and participation regulations and conditions on the
other. Behavioural control mechanisms usually aim to control opportunistic behaviour and
speculation in a project to prevent un-intended actions by setting non-compliance penalties
and also to prevent conflicts through dispute resolution measures.
As illustrated in the table, which is created from the analysis of our nine cases we can
observe diverse institutional relations regulated through different types of contractual agree-
ments that contain a diverse set of control tools (see details from each project in Appendix).
Analysing our cases we can see a considerable variation in the instruments designed to
control project management quality and timing. For example, in the Dutch case performance
measurement is not always controlled in each project, while in Brazil and the UK it is. The
same goes for non-compliance penalties to control opportunistic behaviour. In the case of the
Netherlands and Brazil they seem to be used in some projects but not always, while they
were not part of the legal agreements in the British cases. This is noteworthy as penalties are
important tools for local government to control the timing and quality of the development
process. What is also of particular interest is the wide variety of control of information and
democratic processes even within the same institutional context. What emerges clearly is the
prevalence of fragmented forms of accountability and the absence of forms accessible to
Table 1. Type of control instruments in contractual relations.
Type of control Clause or tool
Procedural control Control of quality and timing Performance measurement
Management plan and quality
Option agreement
Control of responsibilities and ethics Core obligations; liability and indemnities
Exit management plan or exit clauses
Democratic control
and transparency
Control of information Communications protocol; confidentiality
Control of democratic process Democratic inclusion measures
Behavioral control Control of opportunistic behavior Non-compliance penalties
Control of conflicts Dispute resolution
Source: Authors.
Figure 3. Illustrative contents of contractual relations.
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citizens/residents. Nor is it possible to identify standardised forms of accountability and
control instruments that transcend projects within one country. Taken together what this
implies is that accountability and control regimes are constructed on an ad hoc basis, argu-
ably reflecting the prevailing economic, political and ideological contexts and the relative
balance of forces (e.g. bargaining positions) between the relevant parties.
Market-dependent conditions and project-specific context of public-private collaboration
In addition to the variety of available instruments that aim to shape public-private sector
responsibilities and relations in a project, market conditions also add to the fragmentation of
public accountability regimes created by hybrid contractual landscapes of governance. As
municipalities function in close relation with the market and public services are increasingly
dependent on private sector involvement, the context in which the accountability regimes are
formed through complex relations and tools as explained above are also sensitive to the special
market conditions. Our analysis shows that under market-dependent conditions these complex
governance landscapes necessitate some context-specific capacities on the part of the public
sector including flexibility, knowledge of commercial and legal conditions, ability to deal with
uncertainties, and ability to function within market conditions, prioritizing the public interest.
Flexibility in terms of collaboration and negotiations between parties. The fact that legal instruments
bind together the different parties involved in the process requires them to carefully negotiate
processes and targets. In order to be able tomanoeuvre within the system, and adjust the project
based on changing market conditions, collaboration has to provide a certain level of flexibility.
In the case of Brazil, Consorted Urban Operations give local government considerable discre-
tion to interpret the urban operation regulations in order to prioritize works or housing once all
are previewed in the law and in the contract. From the beginning of 2003 to 2017, in Agua
Espraiada, housingwas the last priority, resulting in less than 5%of the promised housing being
completed. After that, pressure from former residents (about 1800 families) and of civil society
representatives saw action with an agreement made requiring that new works only be commis-
sioned once all of the removed families got their new homes (Urbanismo, 2017).2
The flexible nature of contractualism may have varied consequences. For example, the
conduct of negotiations that take place between the private parties involved in the develop-
ment may effectively ‘exclude’ the public sector from the process of negotiations. In the case of
Belvedere, Maastricht, the private sector actors who were responsible for the development had
their own agreement. The municipality agreed to these negotiated decisions, which allowed
them avoid any risk related to the property development which they considered an attractive
outcome. Although informed to a certain extent, the municipality actually knew very little
about these negotiations in the case of the Belvedere, Maastricht case (Respondent 1).
These flexible negotiation dynamics can easily breach the ethical boundaries of private
sector responsibilities and exclude residents from the process. Even though there may be
opportunities created for residents to influence the process, it is not really a co-production
process with active inclusion practices that puts the needs of the wider society at the centre
of the priorities as defined by the private sector companies. These procedural forms of
participation, as argued by Fainstein (2000), fail to take structural inequalities and hierar-
chies of power into account. On the other hand this situation facilitates the creation of
performance control mechanisms between the public and private sector actors. Thus, such
an approach is likely to remain as a part of the contemporary planning experience.
However, it also contributes to the great variation and fragmentation of control of the
public sector in urban regeneration.
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Commercial and legal knowledge and experience with regard to public parties. Planning by contract
results in a process of one-off developments compatible with an entrepreneurial governance
environment where relationships between the public and private sector are closer and fre-
quently overlap. In situations where plan implementation processes follow an opportunity-
driven form, the assemblage of contracts inevitably fragments public accountability. As each
project is ‘different’, standard contracts cannot be used for different projects, and planners
face considerable difficulties in terms of understanding the legal consequences of their
decisions. Defined as ‘plurality of expert knowledge’ (Tas¸an-Kok and van den Hurk,
2019), the diversification of knowledge that planners accumulated through their experience
with contract making and negotiations with the private sector, makes it difficult for such
knowledge to be standardized and used elsewhere.
Urban regeneration projects thus operate in an environment in which regulatory require-
ments and public benefits have to be balanced, which is the most common challenge and reason
they fail: they must contain rules that appear to protect investors to be attractive but they must
assure the maximum public benefit at the same time. The implication is that sometimes loop-
holes emerge in contracts, as in the case of Amsterdam where the terms of the affordable
(student) housing development (rents, units, size, etc) were agreed for the contract by the project
manager from the City of Amsterdam and the developer. However, the contract did not specify
how long these conditions were to apply, which allowed the developer to turn it into a more
expensive housing development at a later date (Respondent 2). Put simply, after the project was
completed rents were increased to a level that was no longer affordable. However, learning from
this experience, planners could include such stipulations in a new generation of contracts. This
represents an example of how planners can gain and apply commercial knowledge.
A lack of commercial knowledge can also lead to more substantial consequences for a
city that goes beyond small mistakes in contracts. In Brazil, this can be seen in the case of
Porto Maravilha (Rio de Janeiro), a large revitalization project of about five million m2
where half of the area has a massive presence of derelict/underused warehouses and indus-
trial plants, and half is dominated by low-income residential settlements. The project aims to
improve urban infrastructure and public services, recover historical buildings and sites,
introduce new cultural attractions and touristic venues, and enhance the supply of office,
retail and residential space within the area, increasing the stock of housing to about 70,000
people. Its funding was designed to be made by selling CEPACs (Certificate of Additional
Construction Potential). The CEPAC was first created in 2003, in S~ao Paulo, in the
OUCAE, as a municipal security, to be sold at auction on the stock exchange, correspond-
ing to a certain amount of virtual land (building rights) to be used for construction inside
regeneration projects in urban operations. In Porto Maravilha all the CEPACs were sold to
just one single shareholder, a semi-public national pension fund (the public agency that
manages a compulsory employee savings fund - FGTS). According to a high-ranking actor
within CDURP (Urban Development Corporation of the Port Region of Rio de Janeiro)
this was a mistake as the single shareholder was able to design and manage the development
to suit their own interests and their availability of resources without any regard for the
timing of the development and impacts on the success of the whole project and the wider
urban area (Respondent 3). In fact, this strategy proved to be unsuccessful in sustaining the
project as there was a lack of resources to invest by the FGTS / Caixa Economica (National
Savings Bank) due to the economic crisis, which slowed the development of the project as a
whole and therefore failed to attract new investors who were afraid to invest in the project
(Respondent 3). In S~ao Paulo, where the CEPACs were sold in parts to diverse developers,
land values increased so much that the public agency could not buy all the land that was
needed to the planned works and housing promotion.
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However, there is a transformative learning experience attached to these negative experiences.
In Amersfoort, the Netherlands, the municipality experienced a remarkable learning curve not
only because the legislation has become sharper but also because the municipal council is more
experienced with dealing with changing plans and dynamic decisions (Respondent 4). It means
that planners accumulate knowledge and experience of working with the private sector through
contracts while they learn and become better equipped to negotiate with private parties.
However, it also strengthens tendencies towards the development of ad hoc systems of control
and accountability that downgrade democratic forms of accountability.
Legal uncertainties due to the multi-scalar and dynamic practice of regulations. Legally binding
mechanisms are insufficient to ensure public accountability as legal uncertainties materialise
beyond single contracts. A range of factors play a role in these uncertainties: the size of
projects; complexities of changing market dynamics; and multi-actor contexts that force local
governments to be more alert and prepared for uncertain market conditions. However, as some
of the Dutch cases show, important shifts in planning discourse have occurred: local govern-
ments are increasingly aware of the need for ‘due diligence’, which is an investigation process
companies would usually follow prior to signing a contract (Respondent 5). In the
Buiksloterham case, residents became stakeholders in a self-build housing scheme, which can
be considered as a more democratic form of urban regeneration (Lloyd et al., 2015). The process
became so complex with multiple stakeholders and rules that understanding how the parts of
the overarching project ‘fit together’ appeared to be difficult. These complexities led the City of
Amsterdam to relax certain regulations to prevent similar problems in the future (Respondent 6).
As urban regeneration projects are dependent on market conditions, local governments
have to turn legal uncertainties to their advantage to keep the market parties interested as
the Belvedere project in Maastricht shows. This scheme, which was badly affected by the
2008 crisis and re-phased, is a complex project, as the business strategies of investors and
developers changed during/after the crisis. Penalties were not included in the main contract
for this project despite the fact that the joint-venture setting created some interesting oppor-
tunities to do so, given the clear transfer of tasks/responsibilities and the risk to private
sector actors (Respondent 1). A similar situation occurred in Brazil, in the Operacao Urbana
Agua Espraiada scheme in S~ao Paulo where part of the works became infeasible due to high
costs, resulting in the suspension of this part of the contract, making the process move
slower (Respondent 7). Another example is the case of Taunton, where the initial agreement
between the Taunton Deane Borough Council (TDBC) and the developer was a ‘straight
land sale’ without consideration of social housing (Respondent 8). This agreement had to be
renegotiated by an arms-length delivery organisation, and the percentage of social housing
on the site was increased considerably. The site now includes a tower block that provides a
significant level of social housing on the site. On the other hand, being squeezed between
market dynamics, funding limitations and a desire to regenerate derelict areas, means local
governments can use legal uncertainties to the advantage of planning. Speaking about the
Harbourside regeneration project a respondent from Bristol City Council (Respondent 6)
indicated that the City shared the costs of hiring local architects with other stakeholders to
draw up a visualization, rather than a master plan.
Taken together these cases indicate a clear tendency for legal uncertainty, created by the
dynamic practices of law at multi-scalar levels, to transform urban regeneration projects
into an on-going multifaceted game where strict rules and legal agreements were intention-
ally and unintentionally combined with uncertainties, providing further justification for the
use of non-standard instruments to control their consequences.
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Private sector parties have their own mode(s) of conduct, rules and traditions within which
they function.While categorizations of developers and investors within the property industry
provides valuable insights (Adams et al., 2012), they provide little evidence regarding the
impact of complex sets of rules of conduct in urban development through contracts. It is not
only that there is considerable diversity within a single category of actors (developers or
investors), but also that the diversity of agents involved in a project differs from case to case.
Considering the number and functions of all the additional actors such as mediators and
networking agents, and their associated rules of conduct, traditions and demands, it is not
surprising that the control instruments developed to safeguard the public interest become
fragmented and diverse, changing from one project to another. One of the most repeated
aspects of private sector involvement in urban regeneration projects that we investigated
were privacy rules and issues connected to this issue. In Bristol’s Harbourside project, for
instance, one of the biggest challenges was ensuring that the Harbourside Sponsors Group’s
decisions were accountable to the public, as this clashed with commercial confidentiality and
the company did not want their involvement to be public knowledge (Respondent 10).
However, despite the conditions set by the market, existing local networks of governance
employed forms of deal-making and consensus building even though there was no legal
obligation at this stage of the project.
In addition to the diversity of actors and their legal actions, another trend in the private
sector is noteworthy. In different ways, but certainly as a tendency, many responsibilities
were transferred to a private special purpose vehicle such as a joint venture company. As a
result, municipalities could not directly oversee everything that took place in terms of
accessing the contracts related to the development of specific plots within the overall devel-
opment. There is a widespread practice of sub-contracting the development of specific plots,
which means that a considerable number of contracts signed involve only private entities.
One respondent from the municipality highlighted the consequences of this trend, as seen in
the case of the Eemkwartier project in Amersfoort: the city was not part of the ground
exploitation, construction and housing preparation for that reason (Respondent 11).
This diversity and complexity also create a necessity for contract management to be a
task of its own to ensure overall regulatory control concerning these increasingly complex
development processes. In S~ao Paulo, OUCAE is managed by two public companies: SP
Urbanism and SP Works. The manager of the first explained that one company
(SP Urbanism) is responsible for managing OUCAE and the other (SP Works) undertakes
general management, the release of financial resources, and the monitoring of interventions.
The latter is also the executing agency as it holds the contracts; and is also responsible for
hiring staff and following up the development. Our respondent underlined that both com-
panies deal with the each other’s departments in the municipality (Respondent 7).
Moreover, a contract defines the obligations and responsibilities of the private sector
parties and also defines the boundaries for each partner. The contract for works in the
OUCAE case in S~ao Paulo involved four contractors, each of which was responsible for
a package of 25% of the works. These disaggregated tasks included part of a tunnel, part of
streets, viaducts and part of a park and 1,000 housing units on land to be made available to
them. As in the case of Amsterdam above, the contract did not specify how long these
conditions were to apply. A senior agent from the Municipal Secretary of Housing of the
Municipality of S~ao Paulo explained that when the tunnel plan was suspended due to a lack
of funds, it also influenced the provision of housing as well (Respondent 12).
Although involvement of multiple stakeholders does not inevitably diminish public
accountability, as can be seen from these experiences, it does create a kaleidoscopic image
of who is accountable, why and what they are accountable for. One thing is certain, the
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everchanging set of actors, their demands and diversity in contractualising their businesses
make it difficult for local governments to function in multi-actor, large-scale regeneration
projects and limits their ability to construct a comprehensive form of public accountability.
Conclusions
In late capitalism, where public planning activities are increasingly reacting to and struc-
tured by market activities and preferences, attempts to maintain public accountability are
sought, measured and ensured through contracts that aim to define roles and responsibilities
in urban development. The actual contracts, their contents and legal implications have
become too complex to follow through traditional comprehensive accountability and con-
trol mechanisms. We argue that accountability does not necessarily ‘disappear’ or diminish
in a linear way but mutates, taking on different forms requiring new instruments that
attempt to control aspects of private sector involvement seeking to protect the public interest
through contractual instruments. Rather than relying on norms and values based on the ethics
of public service, the public sector seeks to develop more concrete and measurable instruments
of control to ensure over-arching accountability. As we elaborated above, these complex
bundles of relations and set of instruments function in a market-dependent environment
where specific context-dependent conditions of public-private collaboration add to this com-
plexity and runs the risk of reducing transparency and accountability. As a result, although
new forms of accountability may be created to control the use and management of public
resources, especially in urban regeneration this accountability may not concern residents.
In order to assess public accountability in this context it is necessary to understand the
diversity entailed in the structure and form of contractual relationships. This implies that
there are a variety of forms of regulation through contracts and other regulatory instru-
ments. As illustrated above, the complex hybrid landscapes of contractual governance create
fragmented regimes of accountability. We have shown that the co-existence of administrative
accountability (Poulsen, 2009) in hybrid contractual landscapes contributes to the develop-
ment of a particular form of democratic deficit as the governance system becomes too
complex, which leads to multiple, and potentially incompatible, accountabilities (Hupe
and Hill, 2007). The current literature on contractual governance provides an ambiguous
picture of private sector involvement in urban development due to the lack of empirical
evidence on contracts. What is not clear in the literature dealing with public accountability is
that everything that is defined or included under the framework of ‘public accountability’,
actually refers to pre-factum accountability, which is, according to Darwall (2006), con-
cerned with establishing the existence of moral obligations before an instance of moral
wrongdoing (Dubnick, 2013). Thus, pre-factum accountability reduces public accountability
down to ‘performance measurement’ (Dubnick and Frederickson, 2011).
We have illustrated that in the practice of urban regeneration projects there is a diversity
of: regulatory instruments; contracts created to define responsibilities in each step of each
action; and control that seek to safeguard public accountability, which create a variety of
accountability mechanisms. In each project these are combined together, in unpredictable
ways, to produce ‘unique regulatory and control regimes’. This contrasts sharply with classic
notions of accountability, which tend to be universal and abstract, based on general ethical
principles and norms. Moreover, in this entrepreneurial governance environment where the
citizen may be seen and treated as a consumer, the forms of accountability may function to
satisfy “consumer rights”.
In addition to these overarching pressures, in the context of urban regeneration projects
further complexities are created through dynamic contractual landscapes. These are the
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product of sets of dynamic relationships between participants, a diversity of relations among
miscellaneous actors, that through regulatory control instruments seek to help the public
sector safeguard accountability in relation to private sector involvement. However, the
public sectors’ use of control instruments has been criticised for marginalizing democratic
accountability to ensure that it does not get in the way of ‘operational efficiency’ (Raco,
2013) and ‘performance management’ (Fine et al., 2017). Our analysis shows how these
control instruments are co-produced by the public and private sector through complex webs
of mutual relations, which create a form of ‘invisible bureaucracy’ (Guttman and Willner,
1976) that undermines any wider notion of public accountability.
In this messiness, we also argue that traditionally conceived public accountability has
been displaced by new forms of accountability that function in ways that are difficult for
non-specialists to understand thus making transparency more opaque, and more traditional
forms of accountability difficult to exercise. While pre-factum accountability in urban devel-
opment creates complexities, it also opens potentials for the development of new measure-
ments/instruments of accountability, albeit ones that are more difficult to understand and
exercise. However, contracts exclude residents (citizens) in the sense that they do not have
any direct involvement in the co-production of public accountability. Residents are not a
party that ‘signs’ the contract and frequently have no access to the contract. Their form of
accountability remains that of electing and protesting. Thus accountability and transparen-
cy are reduced or even eradicated vis-a`-vis local citizens and the wider democratic polity.
The results of these can be more visibly seen in the case of Brazil where harsher socio-spatial
inequalities are experienced especially in the urban regeneration areas where the needs of
already under-privileged residents of favelas could be easily disregarded by the fragmented
regimes of public accountability (Martins and Santos Pereira, 2019; Nobre, 2012). In the UK
and the Netherlands, however, some mechanisms to seek justice exist in urban regeneration
areas if the residents are dissatisfied, though, perhaps only exercised by a few active citizens.
Whilst we can see an element of veracity in Vancoppenolle and Verschuere’s (2012)
conclusion that the involvement of other actors (for- or non-profit) does not necessarily
lead to a total loss of public accountability this claim has to be treated with a degree of
caution as a great deal depends on the experience, knowledge and political will of those
involved to utilise these ‘new tools’ of accountability to maintain public accountability. In
circumstances where these are absent then public accountability may indeed be diminished
or even disappear. In a number of our cases, particularly in the UK and the Netherlands, the
co-production of public accountability through complex sets of relations between public and
private sector actors undoubtedly became more obscure and fragmented but this did not
entirely suppress general public accountability, albeit it made it less easy for citizens to see
the consequences. In the Brazilian cases, the public sector acts in order to obtain financial
gains to support development projects, thus assuming the primacy of a profit-making logic
rather than one of accountability to the community (Martins and Santos Pereira, 2019). For
instance, CEPACs (building rights) are seen as financial means and sold by the municipality
in auctions on the Stock Market. This creates a situation that favours landowners and
specific sectors such real estate and construction, and makes it easier to overlook the
demands of affected slum residents (Nobre, 2012), thus, diminishing accountability partic-
ularly to the favela population. This is not an imperfection of the hybrid governance struc-
ture, but rather of the logic of the system (Fialho Martins, 2015; Siqueira, 2014).
Clearly, what the processes we have discussed do is to distort available comprehensive
accountability mechanisms and over-ride general ethical rules by turning them into a com-
plex and fragmented set of rules set by incomprehensible and non-transparent (especially for
the citizens these services or projects are produced for) legal documents, which are not
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standardized. Such a context does indeed represent a real threat to the exercise of public
accountability in any meaningful sense. In this messy policy environment, it is not surprising
that public accountability may be perceived as a ‘mere spectator’. However, the problem of
urban regeneration today is not the lack of performance control tools, or legitimacy, but
their proliferation and the attendant increasingly blurred frame of general public and private
sector responsibilities, which emerges in parallel to general public norms in hybrid contrac-
tual landscapes of governance. And, arguably, under market-led planning, without clear
public norms we cannot have accountability. As Korthals Altes (2019) underlined the accu-
rate coding of accountability mechanisms in contracts and establishing who is accountable
may help to clarify what needs to be enhanced in the next contractual relationship. However,
to clarify and re-set the public norms in these complex policy environments, more compar-
ative empirical research is needed to decipher the positions of complex set of actors whose
roles are becoming increasingly ambiguous. It is indeed more important to provide a clear
understanding of public and private sector actors’ roles and responsibilities, which are get-
ting closer to each other, than developing a standardised and ineffective set of instruments
that aim to provide a vague understanding of ‘public accountability’. Acknowledging the
complexity of these new institutional settings, which are formed by complex hybrid con-
tractual landscapes is also important. This understanding can help to identify a new set of
‘shared norms’ and ‘facilitative behaviours’ on the basis of which public accountability can
be re-defined through inclusive mechanisms rather than through public delivery tools aiming
to satisfy commercial interests.
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2. GGOUCAE - Management Group of Agua Espraiada Consorted Operation, chaired by the
Municipal Enterprise of Urbanization, based on the participation of municipal bodies, entities
representative of organized civil society and residents of the area, aiming to follow the urban
plans and projects provided for in the Program of Interventions.
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